Family Firms Amidst the Global Financial Crisis: A Territorial Embeddedness Perspective on Downsizing by Amato, Stefano et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04930-0
ORIGINAL PAPER
Family Firms Amidst the Global Financial Crisis: A Territorial 
Embeddedness Perspective on Downsizing
Stefano Amato1  · Alessia Patuelli1  · Rodrigo Basco2  · Nicola Lattanzi1 
Received: 18 August 2020 / Accepted: 23 August 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
This study explores the downsizing propensity of family and non-family firms by considering their territorial embeddedness 
during both periods of economic stability and financial crisis. By drawing on a panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms 
for the period 2002–2015, we show that, all things being equal, family firms have a lower propensity to downsizing than 
non-family firms. When considering the effect of territorial embeddedness, we found that territorially embedded family firms 
have an even lower propensity to downsizing than their non-family counterparts. Furthermore, the concern of territorially 
embedded family firms for their employees’ welfare was particularly pronounced during the years of the global financial 
crisis. This result is explained by the existence of socially proximate relationships with the firms’ immediate surroundings, 
based on similarity and a sense of belonging, which push deeply rooted family firms to treat their employees as salient  stake-
holders during hard times. Overall, our study stresses the importance of local roots in moderating the relationship between 
family firms and downsizing.
Keywords Family firm · Downsizing · Territorial embeddedness · Locality · Global financial crisis · Manufacturing · Spain
Introduction
How and to what extent do firms resort to downsizing when 
an economic downturn occurs? This question becomes rel-
evant because of the ethical aspects of firms’ downsizing 
choices in response to adverse external contingencies (Neto 
& Mullet, 2018). Grounded in agency theory and stake-
holder theory (Carver, 2004), the decision to downsize is 
driven by conflicting moral and legal obligations towards 
shareholders and stakeholders (Hopkins & Hopkins, 1999). 
Thus, the ethical dilemma of downsizing may emerge as a 
trade-off between preserving psychological and social con-
tracts that bind employers, workers and local communities 
together (Van Buren, 2000) and owners’ financial goals and 
long-term firm sustainability (Hopkins & Hopkins, 1999). 
As an example, public opinion, in Spain, highlighted that 
many family firms survived the 2008 global financial crisis 
despite sacrificing profitability to save jobs (Arrondo-García 
et al., 2016). In this sense, the research stream focusing on 
the family nature of ownership and management has shown 
that family firms rely less on downsizing than non-family 
firms (e.g. Bassanini et al., 2013; Sanchez‐Bueno et al., 
2019; Stavrou et al., 2007) because of stronger non-financial 
motives, such as moral obligations (Bjuggren, 2015), repu-
tation (Block, 2010) and long-term orientation (Kappes & 
Schmid, 2013).
Whilst organizational identity arguments have been 
largely put forward to explain family firms’ greater con-
cern for their employees’ welfare (Block, 2010; Stavrou 
et al., 2007), current evidence on family firms and down-
sizing is essentially “place-less” (Shrivastava & Kennelly, 
2013). Specifically, most of existing research (with a few 
exceptions, see Kim et al., 2019) has overlooked territorial 
“anchorage” (i.e. embeddedness) where both family and 
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non-family firms are located as a contingent dimension to 
the decision to downsize. For instance, while family firms 
were found to provide greater employment stability during 
the latest global financial crisis (Ellul et al., 2018), evidence 
for this has been detached from any locational influence 
besides firm-specific characteristics, which is rather sur-
prising given that firms do not exist in a vacuum devoid of 
connections with a place (Oinas, 1997).
To address the aforementioned research limitation, we 
link arguments from the organizational identity theory with 
the embeddedness perspective—which maintains that indi-
vidual behaviours and choices are subject to social influ-
ences emerging from a flow of interactions and shifting 
relationships with others (Granovetter, 1985, 2005)—to 
hypothesize that the relationship between family firms and 
the propensity to downsize is contingent on the level of the 
firm’s territorial embeddedness. It is defined as the firm’s 
ties to a particular place and the degree to which it is condi-
tioned by the economic and social dynamics occurring in the 
local milieu (Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006; Pallares-Barbera 
et al., 2004). Following this reasoning and adding the tem-
poral dimension of crisis, we argue that it is especially in 
times of adversity, such as the global financial crisis that the 
deeply rooted connections of family firms with their home 
territory are likely to materialize (Imperiale & Vanclay, 
2016; Smith, 2016), thereby further enhancing their com-
mitment to safeguarding employment.
To test our hypotheses, we rely on a longitudinal dataset 
of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 2002–2015. 
Spain represents a particularly suitable setting for the pur-
pose of our study for two reasons in particular. First, because 
family firms account for nearly 90% of all firms and con-
tribute to more than 66% of employment and 57% of the 
GDP (IEF, 2017). Second, Spain was hit badly—in terms 
of the unparalleled rise in unemployment—by the global 
financial crisis. While the recession hit European countries 
symmetrically, in Spain it was particularly acute because 
the banking sector crisis coincided with the bursting of the 
housing bubble (Carballo-Cruz, 2011).
Our findings indicate that, all other things being equal, 
family firms are 3 per cent less likely to downsize than their 
non-family counterparts. While territorial embeddedness per 
se does not affect the propensity to downsize, its combina-
tion with the family status of the firm provides a marker 
between the two types of firm. Indeed, territorially embed-
ded family firms are found to be roughly 9% less likely of 
downsize than their territorially embedded non-family coun-
terparts. However, while during the global financial crisis 
family and non-family firms were both forced to downsize, 
the former were 3 per cent less likely to do so. Finally, it 
is throughout the economic downturn that the influence of 
territorial embeddedness between the two types of firms 
was particularly evident. Specifically, we found that the 
propensity to downsize of territorially embedded family 
firms was nearly 12 and half percentage points below that 
of embedded non-family firms during the global financial 
crisis.
This study makes both theoretical and practical contribu-
tions. First, it contributes to the family business literature 
by unveiling the spatial and temporal contingent condi-
tions (Shrivastava & Kennelly, 2013) in which the implicit 
contracts between family firms and their employees are 
honoured (Van Buren, 2000). From this perspective, our 
empirical findings confirm recent evidence (e.g. Kim et al., 
2019) on the conditioning effect of family firms’ local roots 
on the extent to which they resort to downsizing compared 
to non-family firms. Second, our study contributes to the 
ongoing debate regarding the territorial foundation of the 
firm’s downsizing choices and corporate social responsibil-
ity (Attig & Brockman, 2017; Lähdesmäki & Suutari, 2012). 
Nevertheless, our findings highlight the need to discriminate 
firms on the basis of their family status. In this sense, our 
article sheds new light on the so-called family firm-territory 
“nexus” (Amato et al., 2021a), interpreted as the existence 
of embedded ties between family firms and their immediate 
surroundings (i.e. locality) which have a profound effect on 
their attitudes towards their employees (Dekker & Hasso, 
2016).
Finally, this study has policy implications. The impact of 
the global financial crisis on the employment contraction has 
been highly asymmetric both across and within European 
countries, with some European regions and localities being 
more resilient than others (Giannakis & Bruggeman, 2017b). 
The findings allow us to speculate about the composition 
of the local business structure (i.e. prevalence of territori-
ally embedded family firms) as the foundation of a region’s 
ability to withstand economic downturns (i.e. regional resil-
ience). Hence, public policies should take into consideration 
the heterogeneity and ubiquity of economic actors (e.g. fam-
ily firms) when tailoring policy interventions.
This article develops as follows. First, by providing an 
overview of the literature on downsizing and family firms, 
and disentangling the effects of territorial embeddedness and 
the global financial crisis, we present the theoretical back-
ground to our hypotheses. Then, we describe our sample, 
variables and econometric design. Finally, we discuss the 




Downsizing, understood as cutting jobs in the interests of 
firm’s efficiency (Cameron, 1994) and profitability in a 
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changing environment (Cascio, 1993; Datta et al., 2010), has 
received significant attention because of the ethical issues 
involved. On the one hand, particularly during hard times, 
moral and legal considerations towards shareholders oblige 
managers to secure the firm’s financial health and long-term 
sustainability. On the other hand, concerns for employees’ 
welfare prevail on managers to respect implicit and explicit 
contracts that tie employees to their firms (Hopkins & Hop-
kins, 1999). Hence, while downsizing is generally perceived 
as a violation of psychological and social contracts, which 
bind firms, individuals and their communities together 
(Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000), it may be considered fair 
as long as the decision is communicated to employees in 
a timely, appropriate and adequately motivated way (Hop-
kins & Hopkins, 1999). Notwithstanding that, the decision 
to downsize may also clash with the firm’s need to preserve 
corporate reputation (Love & Kraatz, 2009). That is because 
firms are generally prone to making choices consistent with 
prominent aspects of their identities (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989). From this perspective, a shared set of values among 
members of an organization provides meaning and guides 
the behaviour of its constituents and enables the organiza-
tion to locate itself in the social environment (Scott & Lane, 
2000). Nevertheless, firms differ widely in their set of values 
and consequently in their behaviours.
Family firms, being a specific type of enterprise where 
family members are involved in running the business, are 
in a unique position to develop a distinctive organizational 
identity because family involvement can affect organiza-
tional goals (Basco, 2013) and, consequently, choices such 
as the decision to downsize (Stavrou et al., 2007). The exist-
ing research on family firms and employee-related outcomes 
(see Table 1) holds that family firms are less likely resort to 
lay-offs than non-family firms. This hypothesis and, in some 
cases, the empirical evidence is based on the organizational 
identity and social identity theory, along with complemen-
tary perspectives such as socio-emotional wealth, stake-
holder theory and embeddedness.
On the one hand, kinship ties, a shared family name and 
common history, which are inextricably tied to the firm (Sal-
vato & Melin, 2008), create a sense of belonging and togeth-
erness between family members and the firm, which is gen-
erally viewed as an extension of the family itself (Deephouse 
& Jaskiewicz, 2013). Family values, such as trust, loyalty 
and mutual support, are usually embraced by non-family 
members (Zellweger et al., 2010). This, in turn, results in 
a congruence of values and goals between the family and 
non-family employees, enhancing motivation and coopera-
tive behaviour (Kappes & Schmid, 2013), fair pay and work-
ing conditions (Bingham et al., 2011), trust and empathy 
(Zellweger et al., 2013), and tighter implicit contracts (Bas-
sanini et al., 2013; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). For instance, 
the specific organizational identity created by the family 
involvement in the firm is reflected in higher employment 
growth (Diwisch et al., 2009), more employee-related invest-
ments (Kappes & Schmid, 2013) and a greater reluctance to 
cut wages (van Essen et al., 2015) and jobs (Sanchez‐Bueno 
et al., 2019; Stavrou et al., 2007) than non-family firms.
On the other hand, the values and principles shaping a 
family firm’s identity are not confined to the organizational 
boundaries, but extend outwards to relationships with exter-
nal stakeholders, thus, becoming a “salient image of the firm 
in the eye of the public” (Zellweger et al., 2010, p. 58). 
Hence, heightened identification motivates family firms to 
engage in decisions that both enhance and preserve corpo-
rate reputation as an affective value of family members’ self-
esteem (Naldi et al., 2013). This is especially true when a 
firm bears the family name (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013) 
and higher exposure of the family firm to the public eye can 
be a source of either affective benefit or harm for family 
members (Berrone et al., 2010).
Consequently, based on social identity arguments applied 
to the family business and the empirical evidence, we infer 
that family firms are more inclined to preserve implicit con-
tracts with their employees (Bingham et al., 2011; Deep-
house & Jaskiewicz, 2013) and avoid reputation–damaging 
decisions such as downsizing (Block, 2010). Thus, our base-
line proposition is as follows:
P: The propensity to downsizing is lower for family 
firms than for non-family counterparts.
However, the aforementioned proposition is chiefly 
“place-less”, since it ignores the local ties between the firm 
and its home territory potentially influencing family firms’ 
caring attitudes towards their employees (Shrivastava & 
Kennelly, 2013). With few exceptions (e.g. Greenwood et al., 
2010; Kim et al., 2019) current research has overlooked the 
socio-spatial conditions underlying downsizing decisions. 
Hence, to understand the differences in family and non-fam-
ily firms’ downsizing propensity, we next focus on territorial 
embeddedness to disentangle how and when it conditions 
family firms’ downsizing propensity.
Territorial Embeddedness, Family Firms 
and Downsizing
Rejecting the “under-socialised” view represented by clas-
sical and neoclassical economics, the theory of embedded-
ness conceives economic action and decision-making as 
being subject to social influences stemming from a flow of 
repeated and accumulating interactions (Granovetter, 1985, 
2005). Embeddedness has gained growing interest among 
geographers and regional scholars when investigating the 
interplay between the firm, the territory and the extent to 
which the firm depends on its context (Ratajczak-Mrozek, 
2017). As a result, territorial embeddedness evolved as a 
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system interrelated with a given place (Dicken & Malmberg, 
2001; Oinas, 1997) incorporating both the firm’s geographi-
cal location and the fabric of spatially bound relationships 
established therein (Filippi et al., 2011).
The concept of territorial embeddedness is based on the 
firm’s economic linkages with its locality. In this sense, the 
extent to which the firm’s transactions take place mainly in 
the immediate surroundings reflects its economic depend-
ence on and the strength of the firm’s ties with the local 
milieu (Courtney et al., 2008; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006). 
As economic bonds intermingle with the social ones (Uzzi, 
1999), enduring and spatially bounded economic activities 
evolve into a set of localized socially proximate relationships 
(Lähdesmäki et al., 2019). These relationships are based on 
a sense of similarity between local actors and on a common 
feeling of belonging to the same environment, where these 
connections take place (Jones & Woods, 2013; Pallares-
Barbera et al., 2004).
Similarity is understood as the outcome of a spontaneous 
and cumulative process generated by history and repeated 
socio-economic actions occurring in a given place (Capello, 
2019). Shared social and cultural values enable the repro-
duction of a local “consciousness” (Paasi, 2002) as a firm’s 
sense of being part of a given place that implicitly draws 
a boundary around a social community (Pallares-Barbera 
et al., 2004). Similarity creates a feeling of solidarity or 
“anchorage” to the local community, bringing together pri-
vate and collective interests (Capello, 2019), and manifests 
itself either as informal rules or as tangible social actions 
towards the firm’s immediate surroundings (Paasi, 2002). 
The logics of similarity and belonging are found to mould 
the localized network of relationships (Filippi et al., 2011) 
in the form of reciprocal and trust-based ties binding the 
community together (Cox, 1998).
Therefore, repeated economic interactions are expected to 
lead to social relationships based on familiarity, emotional 
closeness and a sense of obligation (Huber, 2012). This, in 
turn, influences the firm’s consideration of the claims of 
stakeholders, in particular employees (Lähdesmäki et al., 
2019) and its responsibility towards the surrounding com-
munity (Capello, 2019; Lähdesmäki & Suutari, 2012). As 
such, we expect that territorially embedded firms, based on 
their economic and social ties with the local environment, 
are less likely to downsize than non-embedded firms. Our 
first hypothesis is therefore:
H1: Territorially embedded firms exhibit a lower 
downsizing propensity than non-embedded firms.
However, some firm-specific characteristics may 
explain the varying strength of anchorage to the territory 
which may either amplify or diminish the underlying feel-
ings of similarity and belonging. One of the firm-specific 
characteristics is family status. Family firms are closely 
tied to the place where they operate (Bird & Wennberg, 
2014), with these connections being not merely economic 
but also inherently social and affective (Amato et  al., 
2021a). For family members, the territory represents the 
place where they grew up, live together and where mean-
ingful life experiences took place (Kalantaridis & Bika, 
2006). The family history is inextricably tied to that of the 
firm, both sharing and concurrently influencing the same 
space of relationships (Smith, 2016). Hence, the overlap-
ping of family and firm-related narratives contribute to 
strengthening the firm’s territorial roots.
Because of their long-lasting and pervasive action as 
both entrepreneurs and members of the community, fam-
ily firms are in a unique position to contribute to and to 
be influenced by a shared set of social practices, values 
and traditions prevailing in a given locality (Soleimanof 
et al., 2018). These become institutionalized in the local 
setting and the basis for the emergence of an intense local 
consciousness (Paasi, 2002). However, the awareness of 
being part of the local community comes with raised social 
expectations towards the family firm along with monitor-
ing and sanctioning mechanisms on its behaviour (Läh-
desmäki & Suutari, 2012). Hence, family firms’ local roots 
turn into spatial loyalty that is a strong “sense of place” 
(Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004). It consists of an emotional 
connection stemming from family members’ attachment 
to and identity with a given area, which becomes “closely 
tied to organizational identity” (Shrivastava & Kennelly, 
2013, p. 96) as reflected in their social behaviour (Pal-
lares-Barbera et al., 2004) and in concrete social actions 
towards their community (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). For 
instance, previous empirical evidence shows that family 
firms are frequently involved in philanthropic initiatives 
(Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012), local investments (Mitchell 
et al., 1997), and have stronger corporate social respon-
sibility concerns towards the local community (Albers & 
Suwala, 2021). Downsizing choices are no exception.
Given the aforementioned arguments, when the eco-
nomic linkages of family firms take place mainly at local 
level (Courtney et al., 2008; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006), 
their feelings of similarity and belonging to their home 
territory are heightened, and consequently their awareness 
of their local responsibilities. Therefore, while we expect 
territorially embedded firms to be more reluctant to make 
redundancies than non-embedded firms, we maintain that 
the influence of territorial embeddedness is stronger for 
family firms than for their non-family counterparts. Hence, 
our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Territorial embeddedness influences the rela-
tionships between family firm status and downsiz-
ing propensity in such a way that the propensity to 
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downsize is lower for territorially embedded family 
firms than for territorially embedded non-family 
firms.
Global Financial Crisis, Family Firms and Downsizing
Social identity theory maintains that particular circum-
stances, such as economic downturns during which firms 
resort to downsizing (Datta & Basuil, 2015), can trig-
ger a collective response in which individuals redis-
cover “social identities” (Stets & Burke, 2000). Whereas 
changed economic circumstances may provide a justifica-
tion to cut jobs, social identification—which is conven-
tionally associated with intra-group cohesion, altruism 
and empathy (Ashforth & Mael, 1989)—acts instead as a 
safeguard for employees. This can be particularly true for 
family firms, whereby uncertainty and the threat of loom-
ing unemployment brought on by an economic downturn 
may further heighten the family firm’s identification with 
the overall community (Smith, 2016).
Family cohesion is related to the emotional ties that 
bind relatives together and are necessary to build intra-
group relationships and prevent fragmentation (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2014). A common family identity based on a 
fundamental agreement about values, beliefs and ongoing 
interactions is a pre-requisite for such unity (Salvato & 
Melin, 2008). In adverse conditions we witness a reaction 
based on the inherent “ability of family members to rely 
on each other” (Sorenson, 2013, p. 127). Indeed, recip-
rocal support goes beyond the family domain to encom-
pass those whose livelihood depends on the business (van 
Essen et al., 2015). This, in turn, strengthens intra-group 
cohesion and organizational identity. Over time, not only 
do non-family employees conform to the family values 
which become incorporated in the business (Sorenson, 
2013), but they also become an extension of the owning 
family itself (Block, 2010). Conversely, massive downsiz-
ing may result in a significant loss of goodwill for fam-
ily firms (Naldi et al., 2013), which might harm family 
harmony and corporate reputation (Deephouse & Jask-
iewicz, 2013). Hence, empathic and altruistic behaviour 
may compel family firms to prioritize employees’ claims 
even in the face of declining profits.
In the light of the abovementioned arguments, we infer 
that an economic downturn, such as the global financial 
crisis, heightens the family firm identity, resulting in 
tighter long-term implicit contracts to employees. There-
fore, our third hypothesis is as follows:
H3: During the global financial crisis the propen-
sity to downsize is lower for family firms than non-
family counterparts.
Territorial Embeddedness, the Global Financial 
Crisis and Downsizing in Family Firms
The impact of the global financial crisis has been highly 
asymmetric both across and within regions, with some 
regions and localities better able to withstand the social and 
economic repercussions (Giannakis & Bruggeman, 2017b). 
This imbalance has several reasons, including the peculiari-
ties of highly embedded milieu such as found in rural areas, 
which show a greater ability to react to economic shocks 
than urban settings (Giannakis & Bruggeman, 2017a). In 
particular, whereas the social fabric of a given place (i.e. 
local social capital) is a key factor in regional and local 
development (Pike et al., 2016; Rutten & Boekema, 2007), 
the embeddedness of people and firms in territorial networks 
plays a crucial role in absorbing the impact of economic 
downturns (Cheshire et al., 2015).
Indeed, socially proximate relationships based on trust 
and reciprocity are deemed to emerge more vigorously in 
periods of crisis, as local actors share and mobilize their 
assets and resources to deal with the negative social and 
economic consequences (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2016). Local 
consciousness of being exposed to the same fate breeds soli-
darity and mutual assistance (Cheshire et al., 2015) and, 
hence, to a convergence of private and collective interests 
(Capello, 2019). Consequently, collective strategies enable 
those affected not only to cope with temporary adversity and 
distress, but also to reinforce their “sense of community, 
social cohesion, and social capital” (Imperiale & Vanclay, 
2016, p. 216). Thus, both individuals and firms engage in 
pro-community initiatives involving the maintenance of 
employment levels.
This is particularly true for family firms whereby the 
social and emotional bonds with their home territory show 
their worth in times of crisis. For territorially embedded 
family firms, the welfare of employees as stakeholders 
becomes a matter of considerable importance (Lähdesmäki 
& Suutari, 2012). Indeed, even though worsening market 
conditions may justify lay-offs, the sense of belonging 
towards the territory (Capello, 2019) can deter embedded 
family firms from cutting jobs (Kim et al., 2019). Altru-
istic behaviour during difficult times enhances the legiti-
macy of both the family and the business in the eyes of the 
local community (Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012). And, this 
legitimacy, upon which the survival and success of the firm 
largely depends, constrains the employer’s options as regards 
downsizing (Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004).
This constraint is primarily due to a mutual awareness 
of both family firms and non-family employees that they 
belong to the same territory, where social and economic 
relationships take place and are inextricably linked (Läh-
desmäki et al., 2019). In particular, as adverse events such 
as the global financial crisis occur, profit motives yield to 
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an emotional closeness of the family towards non-family 
employees and the immediate surroundings whose well-
being and prosperity would be threatened in the event of 
massive lay-offs (Kim et al., 2019). Thus, despite economic 
disadvantages, territorially embedded family firms may feel 
morally obliged to honour implicit contracts (Sraer & Thes-
mar, 2007; Svenn-Age, 1998) and to support the welfare of 
the local community (Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004), where 
both the firm and the family have been established for gen-
erations (Salvato & Melin, 2008).
Previous studies investigating the behaviour of family 
firms during economic downturns found a distinctive influ-
ence of the territory on their decisions to downsize. For 
instance, D’Aurizio and Romano (2013) show that during 
the global financial crisis, family firms worked harder to 
preserve employment levels than non-family firms when 
operating closer to their headquarters. These findings con-
firm that family firms’ intimate relationships with their home 
territory influence their decisions to cut jobs. More recently, 
Amato et al. (2020) found that, during the first years of the 
global financial crisis, family firms located in highly embed-
ded contexts, such as small towns, resorted to making redun-
dancies to a lesser extent than their non-family counterparts 
operating in the same area. Based on the abovementioned 
arguments, we can infer that the moderating effect of ter-
ritorial embeddedness on the relationships between family 
employers and downsizing is further strengthened during 
the global financial crisis. Hence, our fourth hypothesis is 
as follows:
H4: The moderating effect of territorial embeddedness 
on the relationships between family firm status and 
downsizing is higher in crisis periods than in periods 
of economic stability.
Figure 1 depicts the proposed hypotheses.
Data Sources and Variables
Sample and Data
To test our hypotheses, we have relied on longitudinal micro-
data of a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. Spain is an 
ideal setting for our study for several reasons. First, family 
firms are the backbone of the Spanish economy, account-
ing for nearly 90% of private firms and contributing to the 
nearly 67% of employment and 57% of Spain’s GDP1 (IEF, 
2017). Second, while family firms are quite widespread in all 
sectors, their incidence is particularly marked in the manu-
facturing sector accounting for 83% of the total (IEF, 2017). 
Third, Spain was among the European countries worst hit 
by the global financial crisis. After a period of sustained 
economic growth powered by the country’s integration in 
the European Union, since the second half of 2007 the Span-
ish economy started to collapse as a result of the combined 
adverse effect of the U.S. sub-prime financial crisis and the 
bursting of domestic real estate bubble (Jimeno & Santos, 
2014). As a result, the GDP growth rate contracted sharply 
(from 3.5% in 2007 to − 5.4% in 2013) with staggering 
increases in both national debt (from 27% of GDP in 2008 to 
80% in 2013) and unemployment (from 8.3 to 27% in 2013) 
(Royo, 2020). Labour market rigidity and the prevalence of 
temporary contracts exacerbated further job losses in Spain 
throughout the period 2007–2013 (Jimeno & Santos, 2014).
Specifically, this study exploits data from the Sur-















Fig. 1  Hypothesis tested
1 The Instituto de la Empresa Familiar (IEF) is a non-profit organiza-
tion owned by a hundred Spanish family firms leaders in their respec-
tive sectors. Since its foundation in 1992, IEF is the main representa-
tive of family firms in Spain. For more information about the IEF, 
please refer to: www. iefam iliar. com.
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Empresariales”, ESEE) which is conducted yearly by the 
SEPI Foundation2 on a representative sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms. The ESEE aims to collect a wide range 
of information on the strategies, manufacturing and inno-
vative processes, international scope and accounting data 
of firms. It additionally provides detailed information on 
firms’ employment structure by differentiating their work-
force according to the type of employment contracts, pro-
fessional categories and education. For these reasons, the 
ESEE appears to be particularly suited for an investigation 
into downsizing. The ESEE is based on a representative 
sample because it includes all firms with more than 200 
employees, whereas those employing 10–200 employees are 
selected through a random sampling method.3 The initial 
sample consists of 89,056 firm-year observations distributed 
across 5,556 firms for the period 2000–2015. After deleting 
observations with missing data, we obtain a final sample 
of 21,643 firm-year observations for the period 2002–2015 
consisting of 3,330 firms across 20 manufacturing industries 
at two-digit NACE Rev. 24 and 17 Spanish autonomous com-
munities at NUTS-2 level.5
Table SD1 in the supplemental online data shows the 
sample distribution by industry and by region across the 
years. Panel A indicates that Fabricated metal products 
(2,763), Food & Tobacco (2,247) and Non-metal mineral 
products (1,532) have the highest number of observations. 
Panel B shows that observations are mostly concentrated in 




Following the previous literature (Block, 2010; Cascio et al., 
1997), we measure Downsizing as a dichotomous variable 
taking value “1” if the firm’s workforce decreased by more 
than 5% compared to the previous year, whereas positive or 
no changes are set at “0”. Hence, in the latter case, firms are 
regarded as “stable employers”.6
Independent Variables
Family Firm To identify family firms, we relied on the so-
called “demographic approach” (Basco, 2013), which con-
siders the involvement of family members in ownership, 
governance and managerial positions as a sufficient condi-
tion to capture the influence of the family on the business. 
For each surveyed firm, the ESEE provides information on 
the number of family members in managerial positions. Fol-
lowing previous studies (Greenwood et al., 2010; Sanchez‐
Bueno et  al., 2019), we measure Family firm as a binary 
measure coded “1” if one or more members of the owning 
family work in the top management team of the focal firm 
and “0” otherwise.
Territorial Embeddedness Given the nature, depth and the 
extent of a firm’s ties to the local area (Greenberg et  al., 
2018; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006), territorial embeddedness 
emerges as an elusive construct particularly for measure-
ment purposes (Oinas, 1997; Ratajczak-Mrozek, 2017). Not-
withstanding that, we follow Dekker and Hasso (2016) and 
Greenberg et al. (2018) who maintain that a firm’s anchor-
age to its territory is stronger the more the firm depends on 
its immediate surroundings for its sales, whereas a firm’s 
ties to its home base weaken as it expands further afield. 
Therefore, in accordance with Kalantaridis and Bika (2006), 
our measure mainly captures the market-oriented facet of 
3 ESEE has paid attention at the attrition bias across years. This 
occurs wherever participants leave the study, resulting in systematic 
differences between the group that leaves and the one that continues 
the survey. For instance, if a firm answered the survey in 2002 and 
2003 but refused to participate in 2004, this firm was surveyed again 
in 2005–2006. The response rate for the period 2002–2015 was equal 
to 91%.
4 NACE is the abbreviation for “Nomenclature statistique des activi-
tés économiques dans la  Communauté  européenne” and represents 
the European standard classification of productive economic activi-
ties. Particularly, ESEE adopts the NACE Rev. 2 classification imple-
mented in 2006. For more information on NACE classification, 
please refer to: https:// ec. europa. eu/ euros tat/ web/ nace- rev2.
5 NUTS stands for “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics” 
and represents the level of territorial division for statistical purposes. 
The Spanish territory is divided in the following levels: NUTS 1 con-
sists of seven groups of autonomous communities (Agrupación de 
comunidades autónomas); NUTS 2 comprises 19 autonomous com-
munities and cities (Comunidades y ciudades autónomas); NUTS 3 
is made up of 59 provinces and islands, (Provincias, Islas). However, 
the ESEE excludes the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, thus, 
leaving 17 autonomous communities. For more information on NUTS 
classification, please refer to: https:// ec. europa. eu/ euros tat/ web/ nuts/ 
backg round.
6 Since the number of employees consists of self-reported informa-
tion, some might rightly argue the risk of social desirability bias, 
which occurs whenever survey respondents (e.g. individuals and 
firms) intentionally provide answers that they consider socially 
acceptable with the aim of gaining approval from others (Roxas & 
Lindsay, 2012). In our case, firms may enhance their social desira-
bility as good employers or to avoid disapproval in the case of mas-
sive downsizing by misreporting the number of employees. How-
ever, the anonymity of surveyed firms of ESEE mitigates the risk of 
social desirability bias in our study. Indeed, as survey research shows 
(Krumpal, 2013; Roxas & Lindsay, 2012), the guarantee of anonym-
ity and confidentiality is an effective way to promote full disclosure 
of sensitive or stigmatizing information compared to non-anony-
mous  methods, thereby considerably reducing the risk of selection 
bias in survey research.
2 For more information about the SEPI Foundation and ESEE data-
base, please refer to: www. funda cions epi. es.
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territorial embeddedness. Specifically, each firm taking part 
in the survey is required to indicate the geographical area 
of its main market by choosing between six alternatives, 
namely: (i) local; (ii) provincial; (iii) regional; (iv) national; 
(v) abroad and (vi) domestic and abroad. In line with Dek-
ker and Hasso (2016), we operationalize Territorial embed-
dedness as a dichotomous variable taking value “1”, if the 
local area is the main market for the company and “0” if it 
also operates in other markets.7 We restrict the measure of 
embeddedness to the local level only because it delimits the 
closest administrative territory where both firms and people 
are situated and carry on their everyday working life (Paasi, 
2002).8 Additionally, and more importantly, local areas pos-
sess a so-called “imagined coherence” in the sense that their 
residents (e.g. individuals, families and firms) have a par-
ticular sense of identity tying them to the place, resulting in 
a perceived community with a shared pattern of behaviour 
(Jones & Woods, 2013).
Global Financial Crisis Even though the shock affected the 
whole period 2007–2015 with severe consequences in terms 
of job losses, the unemployment rate in Spain was uneven 
both across the economy as a whole and within the above-
mentioned period. Specifically, the average unemployment 
rate of manufacturing was generally below the unemploy-
ment rate in agriculture, construction and services. Based 
on the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS),9 
the number of unemployed increased systematically dur-
ing the period 2007–2012 within manufacturing. The slow 
recovery of the labour market started in 2013. Therefore, 
for the purpose of our study a dichotomous variable named 
GFC which takes value “1” for the years 2007–2012 and “0” 
otherwise is built accordingly.
Control Variables
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we control for a 
wide set of variables potentially affecting downsizing. We 
control for firms’ innovative activity as expressed by R&D 
expenditure to sales (R&D intensity) and innovation achieve-
ments in terms of both Product and Process innovations 
(dummy variable which takes value “1” if a firm introduced 
product/process innovations, “0” otherwise) (Kappes & 
Schmid, 2013). As a firm’s international scope may affect 
the level of employment, we control for Export intensity as 
ratio of foreign sales to total revenues (Block, 2010). The 
variables Age (number of years since the firm was founded) 
and Size (logarithmic transformation of total assets) control 
for the effects related to the size and life cycle of the firm 
(Block, 2010; Sanchez‐Bueno et al., 2019). As downsizing is 
usually a consequence of a firm’s financial distress, we intro-
duce Financial constraints as debt to total assets (Lins et al., 
2013). To account for differences in performance, we control 
for Profitability, expressed as gross operating margin (Stav-
rou et al., 2007). The variables Listed (dichotomous variable 
which takes value “1” if the firm is publicly traded, “0” oth-
erwise) and Group (dichotomous variable which takes value 
“1” if the firm is part of a corporate group, “0” otherwise) 
are introduced to account for constraints and requirements 
of employee-related policies and intra-group workers reallo-
cation, respectively (Block, 2010). As businesses with high 
labour costs are more likely to downsize to reduce their over-
all expenditure, we control for Labour cost ratio computed 
as the ratio of labour costs over total sales (Sanchez‐Bueno 
et al., 2019). To account for investment in human capital, we 
control for Employee T&D measured by total expenses in 
training and development on labour costs (Baù et al., 2019).
Furthermore, as the reliance on temporary and part-time 
contracts may provide flexibility during demand fluctuations 
in terms of employment adjustment, we control for Tempo-
rary workers ratio (ratio of temporary workers over total 
workforce) and Part-time workers ratio (ratio of part-time 
workers over total workforce) (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-
Bueno, 2014). Since downsizing may result from the com-
petitive pressure of rival firms (Gandolfi & Hansson, 2011), 
we control for the number of competitors in the main market 
of the company (Competitors). Rural areas are regarded as 
localities particularly rich in terms of social capital where 
family and community networks result in localization advan-
tages for family firms (Backman & Palmberg, 2015). Hence, 
we control for Rural as binary variable which takes value 
“1” if the firm is located in towns or places with less than 
50,000 inhabitants, “0” otherwise (OECD, 2012). Finally, a 
series of dummy variables are introduced to control for the 
industry, region and year associated with each observation.
Empirical model
To test the proposed hypotheses, we used panel data anal-
ysis with random effects specification. Since we have an 
unbalanced panel, we checked for the stationarity of our 
data using the Fisher unit-root test.10 The null hypothesis is 
7 Similarly to Dekker & Hasso (2016), Greenberg et al. (2018) adopt 
a market-oriented measure of embeddedness computed in terms of 
spatial proximity of the focal firm to more than 60% of customers.
8 With regard to the Spanish context, the local area overlaps with the 
local administrative unit (LAU) as identified by the European Union 
and consisting of 8,114 Municipalities (Municipios). LAU represents 
the lowest territorial units for statistical purposes.
9 The Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS) can be 
obtained from the National Statistics Institute website at the following 
link: https:// www. ine. es/ en.
10 Stata implements a range of tests for unit roots or stationarity in 
panel datasets with the general command “xtunitroot”. The Fisher 
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that all the panels contain a unit root, that is, all series are 
non-stationary. As we obtained p values lower than 0.05, 
we rejected the null hypothesis with all series consequently 
being stationary.
To investigate the decision to downsize with respect to 
the family status of the firm, the existence of territorially 
embedded ties and the global financial crisis, we estimate 
the following model:
where our dependent variable Downsizing represents the 
downsizing propensity; α0 is the constant; β1, β2 and β3 rep-
resent the direct effect of our variables of interest on Down-
sizing; Xi,t is a matrix containing all two- and three-way 
interaction terms for our three main regressors; γ is the cor-
responding vector of coefficients; Ci,t-1 is a matrix of addi-
tional control variables that captures firms’ heterogeneity 
potentially influencing downsizing choices, lagged by one 
year to lessen endogeneity from simultaneity bias (Block, 
2010; Sanchez‐Bueno et al., 2019); δ is the vector related to 
coefficients; Ti, Si and Ri are time-specific, industry-specific 
and region-specific dummy effects, respectively; τ, φ and ω 
are the vectors corresponding to coefficients; and εi,t is the 
error term.
We estimate the above equation by using a linear proba-
bility model (LPM). LPM, a special case of OLS regression, 
is particularly suited to obtaining consistent and unbiased 
coefficients in the case of a dichotomous response variable 
(Wooldridge, 2010). One advantage of OLS over logistic 
models (e.g. Probit/Logit) is that it eases the interpretation 
of both the estimated coefficients, which directly represent 
the marginal effects and the interaction term which is rather 
problematic with logistic models due to the unclear signs or 
incorrect standard errors (Greene, 2010). Additionally, the 
marginal effect obtained from OLS model is very close to 
those obtained from non-linear models (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Finally, we deal with heteroscedasticity concerns by estimat-
ing robust standard errors.
While the sign and significance of the coefficients 
of the variables Family firm and Territorial embedded-
ness are related to the baseline proposition and Hypoth-
esis 1, respectively, Hypotheses 2,  3,  and 4 are opera-





= 0 + 1Family firmi,t
+ 2Territorial embeddednessi,t
+ 3GFCt + Xi,t + Ci, t−1
+ Ti + Si,t + Ri,t + i,t
firm*Territorial embeddedness, Family firm*GFC and Fam-
ily firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC. For the sake of 
clarity, we interpret the interaction terms by group com-
parisons (Dinh et al., 2021). Given the existence of as many 
groups as possible combinations, a specific reference group 
is identified.11 The sign and statistically significance of the 
marginal effect of a given group in comparison with the 
reference group provides straightforward evidence of dif-
ferences across groups. Hence, to investigate the difference 
between family and non-family firm conditionally to terri-
torial embeddedness, the global financial crisis and in both 
instances, the groups Non-family firm*Territorial embedded-
ness, Non-family firm*GFC and Non-family firm*Territorial 
embeddedness*GFC are compared with the reference groups 
Family firm*Territorial embeddedness, Family firm*GFC 
and Family firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC, respec-
tively. For the purpose of our study, while the choice of ref-
erence group leads to the same results, setting family firms 
as reference group also allows us to compare the same type 
of firms across different scenarios.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Panel 2A lists the descriptive statistics for the key regres-
sion variables. While 30% of firms resorted to downsizing, 
family firms account for nearly half of the businesses in our 
sample.12 Only 6% of the firms claim to rely mainly on the 
local area for their sales and, hence, are considered territo-
rially embedded. Finally, the firms in our sample have, on 
average, been in business for 30 years, with the labour costs 
accounting for almost 28% of total costs. Finally, more than 
60% of firms are located in rural areas.
Panel 2B reports the sample differences depending on the 
family status of the firm. As the proportion of businesses 
engaging in downsizing is higher for family firms than 
non-family counterparts, the former are more territorially 
embedded than the latter. Additionally, family firms are both 
less innovative—as reflected in the lower R&D expenditure 
relative to sales and a lower propensity towards product and 
12 The share of family firms out of the total of surveyed firms is fairly 
constant in each year of the time span considered (i.e. 2005–2015). 
Even in the years of the global financial crisis (i.e. 2007–2012), fam-
ily firms' share amounts to 51% of the total, thereby ruling out con-
cerns about sample composition change.
Footnote 10 (continued)
type has a null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root and it is 
implemented by the command “xtunitroot fisher”.
11 In case of a dichotomous variable, Stata allows a change in the ref-
erence group with the command b(1))i. placed before the variable of 
interest. The lowest-numbered group (i.e. 0) is used as the reference 
group by default from the statistical package. The same applies both 
in case of single categorical variables and interaction terms.
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process innovations—and less internationally oriented than 
non-family counterparts. Finally, a higher proportion of fam-
ily firms are located in rural areas (Table 2).
In Table 3, we report the correlation between our regres-
sion variables. While the association between family firm 
status and downsizing is positive but not statistically signifi-
cant, territorial embeddedness is positively and significantly 
associated with downsizing. Both the global financial crisis 
and the labour cost ratio are closely related to downsizing. 
Inspection of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) displayed 
in the same table suggests that multicollinearity is not a con-
cern in our data, as all VIF coefficients are below the toler-
ance threshold of 5 (Baù et al., 2019).
Regression Results
We report the results of our analysis in Table 4.13 In Model 
1 we introduce family firm variable along with control vari-
ables. The coefficient of Family firm is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 0.1% level, suggesting that family 
firms—all things being equal—are more reluctant to down-
size than non-family firms. Specifically, family firms are 3 
per cent less likely to downsize than their non-family coun-
terparts. By looking at the control variables, both process 
innovation (Process innovation) and R&D activities (R&D 
intensity) are negatively related to the propensity to down-
size. Similarly, greater profitability (Profitability) and staff 
training (Employee T&D) are negatively linked to downsiz-
ing. While the size of the firm (Size) does not seem to have 
a significant impact on downsizing, greater levels of indebt-
edness (Financial constraints) do have a positive effect. As 
indicated by the coefficient of Labour cost ratio, a greater 
(relative) incidence of personnel costs is positively linked to 
downsizing. Likewise, we document a positive and negative 
coefficient of both Temporary workers ratio and Part-time 
workers ratio, which indicates that non-permanent employ-
ment contracts allow firms greater flexibility when deciding 
to lay-off.
In Model 2 we add the remaining two explanatory vari-
ables. The coefficient of Territorial embeddedness is posi-
tive but not statistically significant. Therefore, there is no 
evidence that the propensity to downsize is affected by 
the degree to which firms are anchored to their local area. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Finally, the coeffi-
cient of GFC is strongly positive and statistically significant 
at the 0.1% level.14 In particular, the propensity to engage in 
downsizing during the years of financial crisis is more than 
13% higher than in periods of economic stability.
In Model 3 we test Hypothesis 2 by comparing family 
and non-family firms at equal levels of territorial embed-
dedness. The marginal effect of the two-way interaction 
Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness—as opposed 
to family firm counterparts as reference group—is positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level. This result suggests 
that, when it comes to downsizing, territorial embeddedness 
affects family and non-family firms in different ways, with 
territorially embedded family firms much being less likely 
to downsize. Specifically, for territorially embedded family 
firms the probability to downsize is 8.8% lower than their 
non-family and territorially embedded counterparts. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. For a more straightforward inter-
pretation of this result, we plot in Fig. 2a each pair of fac-
tors. It shows that the discrepancy—in terms of propensity 
to downsize—between family and non-family firms widens 
further when both types of firms are territorially embedded. 
Conversely, family firms themselves do not seem to differ on 
account of their embeddedness in the local milieu as shown 
by the marginal effect of the interaction Family firm*Non-
territorial embeddedness which, despite being positive, is 
not statistically significant.
In Model 4 we test Hypothesis 3 by comparing family 
and non-family firms during the global financial crisis. 
The marginal effect of the two-way interaction Non-family 
firm*GFC—as opposed to family firms as reference group—
is positive and statistically significant at 1%, providing evi-
dence that the two types of firms react differently as regards 
downsizing during the economic downturn. Particularly, 
family firms are found 3% less likely to downsize than their 
non-family counterparts. Additionally, Model 4 shows that 
the propensity to downsize of family firms was consider-
ably higher (13.8%) during the global financial crisis than in 
periods of economic stability. Figure 2b depicts each pair of 
factors associated with the two-way interaction. Yet, even if 
the propensity to downsize increases for both types of firms 
during the global financial crisis, the downsizing propen-
sity of family firms is always lower than that of non-family 
counterparts.
Finally, in Model 5 we test Hypothesis 4 by computing 
the marginal effect of the three-way interaction Non-family 
firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC as opposed to family 
firms set as reference group. The marginal effect is positive 
13 It is worth noting that lagging all control variables by one year – 
to mitigate endogeneity concerns – results in the loss of 1,392 firm-
year observations. Hence, the sample used in the regression analysis 
consists of 20,251 firm-year observations distributed through 3,063 
unique firms from 2002 to 2015.
14 Because of collinearity with GFC, in Models 2–5 the time dum-
mies are not included in the estimations. Conversely, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of GFC would jump to 6.84, from to 1.02 in 
case of time dummies exclusion, hence leading to imprecise esti-
mates of the coefficient values and omission of results. The estima-
tion results with the inclusion of both GFC and time dummies can be 
found in the supplemental online data.
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Level of statistical significance +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
a The Wilcoxon rank-sum test determines whether two samples were selected from populations having the same distribution (Sample 1: Non-
family firms; Sample 2: Family firms)
L Expressed in natural logarithm
W Winsor at 1 and 99% tail
Panel 2A: summary statistics for whole sample
N Mean St. dev Min p25 Median p75 Max
Downsizing 21,643 0.327 0.469 0 0 0 1 1
Family firm 21,643 0.489 0.499 0 0 0 1 1
Territorial embeddedness 21,643 0.060 0.237 0 0 0 0 1
R&D intensity 21,643 0.773 2.554 0 0 0 0.397 98.924
Product innovation 21,643 0.192 0.394 0 0 0 0 1
Process innovation 21,643 0.317 0.465 0 0 0 1 1
Export intensity 21,643 22.032 28.406 0 0 7 39 100
Age 21,643 29.135 20.238 0 15 24 38 175
SizeL 21,643 15.871 2.065 8.478 14.207 15.757 17.378 23.965
Financial constraints 21,643 54.09 23.653 0 35.626 55.363 72.601 99.979
ProfitabilityW 21,643 7.297 12.549  − 50.5 2.4 7.3 13.3 40.1
Listed 21,643 0.020 0.142 0 0 0 0 1
Group 21,643 0.364 0.481 0 0 0 1 1
Labour cost  ratioW 21,643 27.742 16.898 3.901 15.784 23.965 35.859 94.394
Employees T&DW 21,643 0.201 0.349 0 0 0 0.3 2
Temporary workers ratio 21,643 11.332 16.658 0 0 5 15.449 100
Part-time workers ratio 21,643 2.682 6.212 0 0 0 2.837 100
Competitors 21,643 2.027 1.255 1 1 1 3 4
Rural 21,643 0.620 0.485 0 0 1 1 1
Panel 2B: Difference of means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test
Variable Non-family firms Family firms Test for difference of means Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
 testa
Difference of means t-statistics z-statistics
Downsizing 0.321 0.333  − .011  − 1.876+  − 1.876+
Territorial embeddedness 0.053 0.066  − 0.010  − 3.864***  − 3.863***
R&D intensity 0.937 0.600 0.337 9.728 *** 34.150 ***
Product innovation 0.232 0.150 0.082 15.499*** 15.414***
Process innovation 0.360 0.271 0.089 14.159 *** 14.095 ***
Export intensity 28.624 15.140 13.484 35.935*** 37.921***
Age 31.346 26.823 4.523 16.539*** 13.288***
SizeL 16.741 14.961 1.780 70.284*** 64.279***
Financial constraints 53.920 54.267  − 0.346  − 1.078  − 1.533
ProfitabilityW 7.498 7.087 0.175 2.409* 2.030*
Listed 0.034 0.005 0.028 15.115*** 15.036***
Group 0.590 0.127 0.363 80.724*** 70.771***
Labour cost  ratioW 25.529 30.054  − 4.525  − 19.873***  − 23.755***
Employees T&DW 0.263 0.134 0.128 27.595*** 37.327***
Temporary workers ratio 10.755 11.935  − 1.179  − 5.212*** 8.988***
Part-time workers ratio 2.149 3.238  − 1.088  − 12.936***  − 4.633***
Competitors 1.836 2.226  − 0.389  − 23.123***  − 23.573***
Rural 0.588 0.653  − 0.065  − 9.961***  − 9.939***
Observations 11,062 10,581
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and statistically significant at 1% level, providing evidence 
that throughout the global financial crisis the propensity to 
downsize of territorially embedded family firms is lower 
than territorially embedded non-family firms. Specifically, 
the propensity to downsize of family firms is almost 12 per-
centage points below that of non-family counterparts. This 
result confirms that the strength of local roots of family firms 
is particularly marked during the global financial crisis, thus, 
supporting Hypothesis 5. To further illustrate this result, we 
plot the three-way interaction in Fig. 2c. The figure shows 
that during the crisis, the downsizing propensity of territori-
ally embedded family firms is far lower than their non-family 
counterparts.
Robustness Check
We performed several robustness tests to corroborate our 
results.15 First, we performed a subsample analysis by 
restricting the observations to the territorial embeddedness, 
the years of global financial crisis and jointly to the ter-
ritorial embeddedness and years of crisis, respectively. In 
all the aforementioned subsamples, the family firm coef-
ficient is negative and highly significant. Second, in lieu of 
the dichotomic measure of family firms (i.e. Family firm), 
we employed a continuous measure counting the number 
of family members in managerial positions. Third, we used 
an alternative definition of downsizing by raising alterna-
tively to 7 and 10% the percentage threshold of employment 
reduction as compared to the previous year. Fourth, given 
the importance of time for firms—regardless of type—to 
develop and nurture their attachment to the local milieu 
(Lähdesmäki et al., 2019; Smith, 2016), we omitted firm 
age from the estimates. Fifth, we used a matching proce-
dure to improve the covariate balance between the treated 
(i.e. family firms) and the control groups (i.e. non-family 
firms) to enhance the estimation of the causal effect. In so 
doing, we implemented the coarsened exact matching pro-
cedure (CEM) algorithm (Iacus et al., 2012).16 Finally, we 
used logistic regression models (Probit and Logit) to esti-
mate our coefficients with the marginal effects of both Logit 
and Probit models that are very close to those obtained with 
LMP. In all the abovementioned cases, we obtained similar 



































































































































































































































































































15 Supplemental online  data provides the results of the robustness 
check (Table SD2).
16 In general terms, matching consists of pruning observations that 
have no close match on pretreatment covariates in both the treated 
and the control groups. We performed CEM algorithm with the com-
mand “cem” on Stata (Blackwell et  al., 2009) and matched on four 
variables capturing the age of the firm, the number of employees, the 
sales and the industry to which firms belong.
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Table 4  Family firms, territorial embeddedness and downsizing
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Product innovation 0.022* 0.017+ 0.017+ 0.017+ 0.017+
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Process innovation  − 0.047***  − 0.041***  − 0.041***  − 0.041***  − 0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
R&D intensity  − 0.536***  − 0.565***  − 0.571***  − 0.565***  − 0.570***
(0.157) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Export intensity  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size  − 0.005  − 0.005  − 0.005  − 0.005  − 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Financial constraints 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability  − 0.002***  − 0.002***  − 0.002***  − 0.002***  − 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Listed  − 0.022  − 0.026  − 0.026  − 0.027  − 0.026
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Group 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Labour cost ratio 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employee T&D  − 0.023*  − 0.021*  − 0.021+  − 0.021*  − 0.021+
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Temporary workers ratio 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Part-time workers ratio 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Competitors  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000  − 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rural  − 0.009  − 0.008  − 0.009  − 0.008  − 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Family firm  − 0.032***  − 0.034***
(0.008) (0.008)




Family firm*Territorial embeddedness as reference group
 Non-family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness 0.054*
(0.021)
 Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness  (H2) 0.088**
(0.029)
 Family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness 0.023
(0.021)
Family firm*GFC as reference group
 Non-family firm*Non-GFC  − 0.100***
(0.010)
 Non-family firm*GFC  (H3) 0.030**
(0.011)




Drawing on the perspectives of territorial embeddedness and 
organizational identity, this study investigates the downsiz-
ing propensity of family and non-family firms by consider-
ing the moderating effect of territorial embeddedness and 
the global financial crisis. Previous studies have shown that, 
when confronted with the ethical dilemma of preserving 
the firm’s financial health or occupational levels (Hopkins 
& Hopkins, 1999), family firms are less inclined to down-
size compared with non-family firms (e.g. Bjuggren, 2015; 
Block, 2010; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). However, the joint 
influence of territorial embeddedness—understood as the 
embodiment of geographic and social proximity based on 
a sense of belonging and territorial identity (Lähdesmäki 
et  al., 2019)—and external contingencies on downsiz-
ing choices has been largely overlooked. As firms “do not 
exist in a vacuum devoid of connection to actual locations” 
(Guthey et al., 2014, p. 259) and temporal context (Arrondo-
García et al., 2016), anchorage to their home territory stands 
out both as a source of opportunities (Capello & Faggian, 
2005; Uzzi, 1999) and constraints (Hess, 2004), with ter-
ritorial embeddedness signalling a state of dependence on 
the place (Ratajczak-Mrozek, 2017). From this perspec-
tive, downsizing choices, both under normal circumstances 
and economic downturns, may be contingent on the set 
of economic, social and emotional connections that firms 
have established with their geographical and social milieu 
(Capello, 2019; Dicken & Malmberg, 2001).
The table presents linear probability model estimates based on a panel dataset over the period 2002–2015. The dependent variable is Downsizing 
which is coded “1” if the negative change in numbers of employees as compared to the previous year is higher than 5%. Positive changes are set 
to “0”. Family firm is a dummy variable equal to “1” if one or more family members occupy managerial position in the firm and “0” otherwise. 
Territorial embeddedness is a dummy variable equal to “1” if the local area represents the main market for the firm and “0” if the firm also oper-
ates in other markets (provincial, regional, national, abroad, domestic and abroad). GFC indicates years 2007–2012 during which the global 
financial crisis occurred. Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses
Level of significance +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 4  (continued)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
 Family firm*Non-GFC  − 0.138***
(0.010)
Family firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC as reference group
 Non-family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC  − 0.062*
(0.027)
 Non-family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*GFC 0.066*
(0.028)
 Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC  − 0.044
(0.039)
 Non-family firm*Territorial embeddedness*GFC  (H4) 0.117**
(0.039)
 Family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC  − 0.099***
(0.027)
 Family firm*Non-territorial embeddedness*GFC 0.042
(0.027)
 Family firm*Territorial embeddedness*Non-GFC  − 0.101**
(0.032)
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes No No No No
Constant 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.190** 0.349*** 0.309***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.062)
WaldChi2 1688.94 1182.97 1185.82 1182.93 1187.13
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of firms 3,063 3,063 3,063 3,063 3,063
Observations 20,251 20,251 20,251 20,251 20,251
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Fig. 2  a Margins plot fam-
ily firm*territorial embed-
dedness. b Margins plot 
family firm*global finan-
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Our results highlight the importance of territorial embed-
dedness for a greater understanding of the differences 
between family and non-family firms’ propensity to down-
size, both in times of economic stability and subsequent 
downturns. Regarding the general stance towards downsiz-
ing, in line with previous studies (Bassanini et al., 2013; 
Stavrou et al., 2007), we corroborate that family firms have 
a lower propensity to downsizing than non-family firms. 
The family’s identification with the business and family 
values, such as closeness, reciprocity and trust, is likely 
to extend beyond the family domain, thereby heightening 
the psychological and social bonds between family firms 
and their employees (Bingham et al., 2011; Deephouse & 
Jaskiewicz, 2013). While territorial embeddedness per se 
does not affect downsizing propensity, in the case of family 
firms it was found to play an important role. Specifically, the 
strong economic links and territorial identity of family firms 
turn into a spatial loyalty which further mitigates the pro-
pensity to downsize compared to non-family firms. Hence, 
as local roots provide locational advantages to family firms 
(Backman & Palmberg, 2015; Baù et al., 2019), our findings 
support earlier studies showing the association between the 
embeddedness of family firms in the local milieu and their 
pro-social behaviour (Berrone et al., 2010; Dekker & Hasso, 
2016).
As the global financial crisis forced firms to cut jobs, our 
results reveal different responses, with family firms found 
to be less likely to downsize than non-family counterparts. 
This finding is at odds with that of Lins et al. (2013) who 
have shown that, during the early years of the global finan-
cial crisis (i.e. 2008–2009), family firms were equally likely 
to downsize as non-family firms. Conversely, this result is 
consistent with previous studies highlighting the altruistic 
behaviour of family firms towards their employees in the 
event of industry-specific shocks (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007) 
or economic downturns (Lee, 2006; van Essen et al., 2015). 
Specifically, our study confirms the findings of Arrondo-
García et al. (2016) which reveal that during the most acute 
stages of the global financial crisis in Spain, family firms 
provided more employment stability than other firms.
However, considering separately the effects of territorial 
embeddedness and the global financial crisis on family ver-
sus non-family firms only offers a partial view of how the 
contextual dimensions influence firms’ downsizing choices. 
Indeed, when territorial embeddedness and the global finan-
cial crisis are considered simultaneously, we found that the 
concern of territorially embedded family firms for their 
employees particularly stands out in times of adversity. 
Socially proximate relationships with the firms’ immedi-
ate surroundings, based on similarity and affective bonds 
push family firms to consider the needs of their employees 
whose well-being and that of the local community would be 
endangered in the event of massive lay-offs. The difference 
in the propensity to downsize between territorially embed-
ded family and non-family firms equals nearly 12%, showing 
that family firms downsized less than non-family firms. This 
result reveals the amplified spatial loyalty of family firms 
in time of crisis, which does not appear to the same extent 
when territorial embeddedness and the global financial crisis 
are considered separately (8.8 and 3%, respectively). These 
findings are consistent with D’Aurizio and Romano (2013) 
and Amato et al. (2020), who have shown the role of location 
in the decision to safeguard the employment levels of fam-
ily firms during the early years of the global financial crisis. 
Hence, our study confirms the uniqueness of territorially 
embedded family firms in limiting the detrimental effects 
of economic downturns on employment.
Contributions and Policy Implications
Our study has theoretical and practical implications. First, 
it contributes to the family business literature examin-
ing the downsizing propensity of family and non-family 
firms (Amato et al., 2021b) based on embeddedness in the 
home territory and external contingencies (the global finan-
cial crisis). In this sense, we attempt to address the place-less 
research gap in family business studies (Stough et al., 2015). 
Following the debate into the locational effect on the pro-
social behaviour of family firms (Dekker & Hasso, 2016; 
Kim et al., 2019), we reveal the conditions under which the 
favourable attitudes of family firms towards their employees 
are likely to materialize. While previous studies considered 
the characteristics of the territory where the family firm 
is located (Greenwood et al., 2010; Kim et al, 2019), we 
show that the anchorage of family firms in their local milieu 
clearly affects their propensity to downsize. In this way, our 
results reveal that the intimate connections between fam-
ily firms and their immediate surroundings—arising from 
a deeper sense of place and togetherness with their home 
territory (Kim et al., 2019)—result in heightened awareness 
of the needs of their employees, as salient stakeholders, in 
times of adversity (Van Buren, 2000).
Second, this research contributes to the ongoing debate on 
the pro-social behaviour of businesses—with respect to safe-
guarding employment—and localities (Attig & Brockman, 
2017; Lähdesmäki et al., 2019). As firms’ local responsibili-
ties are linked to geographical areas and socially proximate 
relationships, our study highlights the importance of distin-
guishing firms according to their type—that is between fam-
ily and non-family firms—when the territorial foundations 
of corporate social responsibility are investigated. In particu-
lar, by introducing the spatial scope of embeddedness into 
the investigation of family firms’ downsizing choices (Hess, 
2004; Ratajczak-Mrozek, 2017), we corroborate family firms 
as a distinctive type of enterprise (Shrivastava & Kennelly, 
2013), deeply rooted in a given place (Amato et al., 2021a) 
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and committed to balancing survival and success with the 
well-being of the local community where they are placed 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Kurland & McCaffrey, 2020).
Finally, our research has implications for policy makers. 
As the negative repercussions of the global financial crisis 
spread across European regions in a markedly uneven man-
ner (Groot et al., 2011), the concept of regional resilience, 
generally understood as the ability of a regional or local 
economy to withstand recessionary shocks, has attracted 
increasing interest (Fratesi & Perucca, 2018). In light of our 
findings, regional authorities should consider family firms’ 
embeddedness and concentration in their home territories 
when tailoring either swift responses to the impact of eco-
nomic downturn or place-based policies aimed at rebalanc-
ing the territorial effects of economic crisis (e.g. European 
cohesion policy) (Giannakis & Bruggeman, 2017b). In 
addition to this, our research highlights the need for more 
awareness by policymakers of the unique and valuable role 
of family firms when policies aimed at fostering regional and 
local growth are designed (Basco & Bartkevičiūtė, 2016; 
Pike et al., 2016).
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Our research has several limitations which could pave the 
way for future research. First, our definition of family firm 
does not consider either ownership thresholds or the role of 
the controlling generation. As previous studies have shown, 
the consideration of non-economic aspects affecting down-
sizing are heavily dependent upon both the percentage of 
common stock owned by the founding family (Block, 2010) 
and the generation in control (Arrondo-García et al., 2016). 
Hence, future studies should investigate whether and to what 
extent territorial embeddedness influences downsizing pro-
pensity in different ways depending on the thresholds of 
family ownership and between the first generation vs. multi-
generational family businesses.
Second, as our study relies entirely on a demographic 
approach to define family firms, future studies should test 
the consistency of our results with multiple definitions of 
family firms, integrating the components of involvement and 
essence approaches accounting for “soft” factors such as the 
vision and intentions (Basco, 2013).
Third, alternative measures of territorial embeddedness 
could be employed to investigate whether family firms’ 
downsizing propensity is sensitive to different operationali-
zations of local roots. Specifically, alternative and comple-
mentary measures—based on the distance from headquar-
ters (Berrone et al., 2010; D’Aurizio & Romano, 2013), 
stakeholder proximity (Amato et al., 2021a), place tenure 
(Baù et al., 2019) and percentage of inputs and informa-
tion coming from the local setting (Kalantaridis & Bika, 
2006) among other factors. However, the most promising 
way to face the challenge of measuring a firm’s local ties 
is to validate a “holistic” measure of territorial embedded-
ness entailing the multiple underlying dimensions, capable 
of fully grasping the conditioning effect of local milieu on a 
firm’s decision-making and outcomes.17 Fourth, as our study 
considers only one country (Spain), future research should 
expand the analysis to other countries to account for the 
influence of different institutional and cultural settings on 
the decision to downsize in response to recessionary shocks 
(Lins et al., 2013). Since our research does not consider dif-
ferences in regional labour markets, which could potentially 
limit a firm’s room for manoeuvre as regards downsizing 
(Svenn-Age, 1998), future research should investigate the 
sensitivity of territorially embedded family firms to differ-
ences in labour markets (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 
2014).
Fifth, as our study develops from a micro-level approach, 
future studies may step into a meso-level perspective to 
explore the role of the collective aggregate actions (i.e. fam-
ily firms “density”) as a source of regional resilience (Block 
& Spiegel, 2013). Sixth, in addition to economic downturns, 
other types of exogenous shocks such as natural disasters 
may adversely affect the economic and social structure of a 
given region or locality (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2016). Hence, 
it would be worth deepening the role of family firms’ spa-
tial loyalty in coping with such adverse events (Cheshire 
et al., 2015; Smith, 2016). Finally, the family firm-territory 
“nexus” stands out as a promising opportunity for investi-
gation with qualitative research methods (e.g. case studies, 
in-depth interviews). Indeed, a qualitative approach may 
prove extremely useful in developing new theories and test-
ing existing ones. Only through an in-depth investigation of 
the economic and socio-spatial dynamics in context, might 
it be possible to understand the genius loci of family firms, 
that is, how the sense of place is produced and evolves across 
time (Shrivastava & Kennelly, 2013), uniquely influencing 
the relationships between family firms, territory and pro-
social behaviour.
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